53-H	CONFIDENTIAL
Action EUR Info	Control: 676 Rec'd: APR 任 1, 1959 2:58 P.M.
RMR	T0: Secretary of State
SS	NO: 2185, APRIL 1, 7 P.M.
W G SP	PRIORITY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C L INR	SENT DEPARTMENT 2185, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY BERLIN 750, LONDON 553, MOSCOW 253, PARIS 752.
H P UOP	PRIORITY SENT USAFE ADVON 26 CINCUSAFE 406 USAREUR 522 BY OTHER MEANS  PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, CINCEUR, THURSTON, WEST  REF. (A) BERLINTEL 701 TO BONN 820 DERT. MARCH 20
E IRC	PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, CINCEUR, THURSTON, WEST
DCL OCB USIA	REF (A) BERLINTEL 741 TO BONN 829 DEPT., MARCH 30  (B) DEPTEL 2293 TO BONN, MARCH 30
CIA OSD ARMY AIR	1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY DRAFTREPLY SOVIET PROTEST RE HIGH  ALTITUDE FLIGHTS. UPON RECEIPT ADDRESSEE'S COMMENTS AND  DEPT'S CONCURRENCE, EMBASSY WILL COORDINATE FINAL DRAFT WITH  ERITISH AND FRENCH.
NAVY	GUOTE REFERENCE IS MADE TO SOVIET PROTEST OF MADEL OF CONSERVANO

REFERENCE IS MADE TO SOVIET PROTEST OF MARCH 27 CONCERNING THE FLIGHT OF THE C-130 AIRCRAFT TO AND FROM BERLIN,

THE US ELEMENT REJECTS THE SOVIET CONTENTION THAT FLIGHTS AT HIGH ALTITUDES ARE PRECLUDED BY REGULATIONS COVERING FLIGHTS IN THE CORRIDORS, NOR DOES IT AGREE THAT THE FLIGHT OF THE C-130 AIRCRAFT, DULY NOTIFIED TO THE SOVIET ELEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRACTICE, CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF PRESENTLY EXISTING RULES. AS STATED IN THE LETTERS FROM THE US CONTROLLER TO THE SOVIET CONTROLLER OF JUNE 6 AND SEPTEMBER 8, 1958, WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE ANY LIMITATION TO THE RIGHT TO FLY AT ANY ALTITUDE. FURTHERMORE, REGULATIONS DO NOT REQUIRE THAT DIFFEREN PROCEDURES BE FOLLOWED FOR DIFFERENT FLIGHT ALTITUDES. OUR JUNE 6 LETTER WE POINTED OUT THAT THE ALTITUDE AT WHICH

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-2- 2185, APRIL 1. 7 P.M., FROM BONN

AIRCRAFT FLY IS DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILING AT THE TIME AND THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIRCRAFT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS CALL FOR THE USE OF HIGHER FLIGHT ALTITUDES, AND IMPROVED AIR NAVIGATIONAL FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES PROVIDE ADEQUATE SAFETY FOR SUCH FLIGHTS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DELIBERATE HARRASSMENT OF THIS FLIGHT BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT, REFERRED TO IN OUR PROTEST OF MARCH 29, CONSTITUED NOT ONLY A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF CORRIDOR REGULATIONS, BUT INTENTIONALLY CREATED THE VERY HAZARD TO FLIGHT SAFETY ABOUT WHICH THE SOVIET ELEMENT HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN. WE FULLY APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF AND OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN THE SAFETY OF FLIGHT THROUGH THE CORRIDORS.

THE CONDITIONS FOR FLIGHT SAFETY CAN BE MET IF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WILL ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES AND SEPARATE THEIR AIRCRAFT FROM WESTERN FLIGHTS NOTIFIED TO THEM. IN REFERENCE TO THE PARTICULAR FLIGHT INVOLVED, THE FLIGHT PLAN WAS PASSED TO THE SOVIET ELEMENT IN BASC OVER ONE HOUR PRIOR TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE AIRCRAFT INTO THE CORRIDOR, THUS PROVIDING AMPLE TIME TO NOTIFY AIRCRAFT LIKELY TO BE IN THE VICINITY AS IT PASSED THROUGH.

THE US ELEMENT MUST THEREFORE REJECT AS UNFOUNDED THE SOVIET CONTENTION THAT ANY US VIOLATION OCCURRED. FURTHERMORE, THE US ELEMENT CONSIDERS THE IMPLIED THREAT CONCERNING "UNDESTRABLE CONSEQUENCES" ENTIRELY UNWARRANTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DELIBERATE HARRASSMENT DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE FURTHERANCE OF FLIGHT SAFETY IN THE CORRIDORS. MOREOVER, US AIRCRAFT WILL CONTINUE TO FLY THROUGH THE CORRIDORS AT WHATEVER ALTITUDE IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, AND WITH DUE NOTIFICATION TO THE SOVIET ELEMENT AS IN THE PAST. UNQUOTE

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- -3- 2185, APRIL 1, 7 P.M., FROM BONN
- 2. RE POINT 6(A) OF REFTEL (B), EMBASSY BELIEVES REPLY SHOULD BE LIMITED TO POSITION TAKEN IN SOVIET WRITTEN PROTEST AND NOT ON SOVIET CONTROLLER'S ORAL COMMENTS.
- 3. RE POINT 6(B), IFR FLIGHT PLAN FILED FOR BOTH IN AND OUT FLIGHT, EVEN THOUGH VMC CONDITIONS PREVAILED. USAFE MAY WISH CONSIDER FILING VFR PLAN FOR A SUBSEQUENT FLIGHT.
- 4. RE POINT 7, BELIEVE SUGGESTED REPLY ADEQUATELY COVERS THESE POINTS AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT DEVIATE AT THIS TIME FROM POLICY OF NOT CITING SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS.

TIMBERLAKE

UE/22

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